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Summary findings
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retrenchment in state-owned industrial enterprises in  current magnitude (20 percent of the labor force) would
China. Their results indicate the prevalence of low and  secure only 2 percent gains in output. A transfer of 10
stagnant labor productivity, low capital productivity, and  percent  of both capital and labor would achieve a greater
excessively  high wages in the state sector for the period  efficiency gain than transferring the full 43 percent of
reviewed (1994-97).  redundant  workers. This is partly because the private
The private sector exhibited consistently greater  sector uses capital more efficiently than the public sector
productivity.  and partly because it needs capital to hire workers
The authors'  most striking finding: A greater gain  transferred  from the public sector.
could be realized from capital transfer than is being  Their results suggest that reform in state enterprises
gained from labor retrenchment.  should concentrate more on the efficiency of capital
Their simulation results for 1996 estimate that 43  allocation, not just on labor retrenchment.  More efficient
percent of the workers in state enterprises and 70  capital allocation would reduce the pressure on labor and
percent of the capital are redundant.  By itself, a t-ansfer  would bring larger gains at a lower social cost.
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At present, China is at a  critical stage in its economic development, experiencing new and
growing unemployment and labor problems. The rise in unemployment is directly related to
lower  demand  emanating  in  the  public  sector,  itself  reflecting  a  steep  deterioration  of
profitability in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) over time. Approximately 50 percent of SOEs
are now facing losses and the prospect of bankruptcy. In the past few years, (net) job creation by
SOEs has collapsed. And disguised and open unemployment in SOEs is growing rapidly with a
vast number of their workers losing jobs and benefits.
At the same time, the state enterprise sector, and the banking system which is backing it are in
deep financial trouble. The banks have incurred large amounts of non-performing debts as a
result of their financial support of SOEs, with accumulated losses now estimated at between 20
to 40 percent of total loans (about the same share of GDP). The Chinese banking system has
emerged as a clear risk to sustained growth at a time when the social pressure on banks to bailout
SOEs are becoming stronger. As a result of these forces, the reform of the SOE sector is now at
the center of the policy-makers efforts. The coincidence of labor and financial/fiscal difficulties
poses several fundamental challenges to the Chinese policy-makers: how to stop the financial
hemorragea without creating social unrest? How to encourage other sectors to take on the relay
on job creation? And how to redirect resources to these more efficient sectors?
In an  attempt to reduce the scope of the problem, the Chinese government has focused its
attention recently on the mis-allocation of labor between the public and private sectors, and it has
announced ambitious plans  to  improve the profitability of  SOEs through  downsizing. This
1includes a plan to encourage 30 million workers to transfer to the private sector-a  figure that
represents 30 percent of SOEs workers and 15 percent of the urban labor force. In parallel, the
government has initiated reforns  to  shift the delivery of key services previously provided by
SOEs such as housing, health care, education, old age security to new providers in the private
sector,  public enterprises and local governments. 4
The major focus of this paper is to estimate the likely costs and benefits of SOEs reforms on
labor, although we also look at the likely gains attached to a re-allocation of capital between the
state and private sectors. The focus is on industry, for whom reasonable historical series of
provincial output has been released recently (in the China Statistical Yearbook, 1994-97). In the
first part of the paper, we compare the evolution over time of the efficiency in the use of labor
and capital in the state and non-state sector and assess the factors behind the change in the
relative performanceI  of these sectors. In the second part, we simulate the effects of transferring
labor from the least efficient sector to the most efficient, and estimate the potential gains in
output and the effect on the fiscal accounts and the state of the banking system. In the concluding
section, we contrast our previous results with estimates of what can be achieved by transferring
capital to the private sector, and offer some suggestions to explain the lack of current focus on
the allocation of capital.
4 The government  also has plans to divest small- and medium-size  SOEs, but it has refused to relinquish control over
the large "strategic" industries.
2II. The Relative Performance of the State and Non-State Firms in the Chinese Industrial
Sector
The development of  the  large  SOEs that  tower  over China's  industry has  been  one  of the  main
achievements of industrial policy over the past four decades. Lin et al (1996) recount how all major prices
were distorted starting in the 1965s in order to help achieve the aim of building what was perceived as the
strategic engines of growth - heavy industry, energy, machinery. These "strategic" industries were capital
intensive, urban, and modern. To achieve these aims, capital, foreign exchange, and energy had to be
available at cheap prices. Input prices were heavily subsidized. The resulting backlash on the rest of the
economy was such that ultimately, the state nationalized most of private enterprise in the 1960s.
Several studies have described the steady deterioration in state controlled industry, as a result of incentive
and informational problems. As a result, several waves of reform have been initiated over the years by the
government. The privatization of farming sector in 1979 turned out to be a major success and favored a
definite movement towards more private sector activity. Over the past decade, China's industrial growth
has relied mainly on the dynamic performance of private and small collective owned enterprises, in
particular, the township and village enterprises (TVEs). In the late  1980s saw the emergence of joint-
ventures investments spearheaded by large MNCs and Chinese capital from the rest of Asia, and this FDI
and increase in export growth became the main engine of growth. 5 The role of state turned to the
containment of the scope of losses in the public sector, under a self-imposed constraint of maintaining a
fast growth rate in the midst of stable macroeconomic policies.
In the  headways  of the  1980s and  1990s, this  strategy  played  out well.  State-owned  enterprises
gradually  lost their  importance  to the  non-state  sector.  This in turn  reduced  the pressure  on  the
5 In the 1990s,  China  has attracted  a large  share  of FDI  going  to developing  countries,  averaging  about  $45  billion  a
year in  the past  decade.
3state to crowd out this sector by directing credit to state enterprises, and improved the credibility
of the government in pursuing a market friendly strategy. The result was no less than dramatic.
In 1980, SOEs produced 76 percent of gross industrial output.  By 1997, this share had fallen by
nearly two-thirds to  25.5 percent. Private enterprises, shareholding firms, joint  ventures, and
foreign-owned firrns increased their share from 0.5 to 36.4 percent over the same period. (See
Table 1)
Efficiency Considerations: A Literature Review
Containing the costs of this  strategy has necessitated a continuous attention to the financial
health of SOEs. An important set of reforms was initiated with the establishment of the "contract
responsibility system" that established some accountability in the SOE system in  1979. More
recently, a modem  rules-driven corporate system was introduced to  state enterprises. These
reformns  have generally achieved their  intended goal  of  improving technical  efficiency. In
industry, estimates of  the production  function in  several  studies  demonstrated that  greater
enterprise autonomy increased the  productivity of  the  state  enterprises (Chen  et  al.  1988,
Jefferson, 1994, Dollar 1990), but at a lower rate than private sector.
But the financial position of SOEs has deteriorated more sharply since 1992. The total deficits of
unprofitable industrial SOEs increased five-folds since the early 1990s. Two factors have been
analyzed in the literature to  explain the poor performance of SOEs in recent years, a rising
compensation  bill, and relatively decline in technical efficiency.
4The first factor is the rapid rise in wages and fringe benefits such as housing, education, health
care, and retirement pensions (Sachs, Woo, 1994, Gordon and Li, 1997). Wages have generally
risen at a slightly slower pace than output growth 6 reflecting strong labor demand by the non-
state sector. Previous studies argued that the increasing autonomy of SOEs in the absence of
private property rights has led to excessive workers remuneration. Specifically, in their enterprise
sample Woo et al. (1994) report a large increase in the share of labor incomes through value-
added.  A study by Fan and Schaffer show that the increase in government subsidies is due to a
faster increase in wages, fringe benefits and other unauthorized expenditures (Fan an Schaffer
1991). The social obligation of SOEs is not a new phenomenon. However, in recent years the
cost of providing social welfare has risen fast. 7 There are two main reasons for this rapid increase
during the 1990s: aging population, and rising medical costs. As the proportion of employed
labor shrinks and the number of pensioners rises, SOEs are forced to draw on current revenue to
fund spending on increasingly expensive social welfare. 8 Data from China Yearbook shows that
the share of insurance and social welfare funds" in the state sector has risen from 17% in 1980 to
33% of total wage bill in  1997 (if we include employer subsidies to housing and the cost to
enterprise of dealing with redundant workers, estimated ratio could be up to 75% of total wage
Two possible  reasons: first, the Chinese governuent  has been able to maintain  substantial  implicit  taxes and
transfers  among  workers  in the state sector,  implemented  through  direct controls  over relative  wage rates.  Second,
lack of influence  of labor  union  over  wage  rates  (Gordon  and  Li, 1997)
7For  example,  the social  welfare  bill increased  from 11.6  billion  in 1980  to 257.8 billion in 1997,  a rise of 182
percent  at current  prices.
8 The World Bank "China 2020" reports that the ratio of workers to pensioners is projected to decline from 10 to I
in 1995 to about 3 to I in 2050.
5bill). Over the same period, the profit rate in the state sector has fallen from around 20% in 1980
to 6.9% in 1996.
The second factor  has  been the  relative slow  improvement in  the  state sector's  technical
efficiency (Chai, 1994; Woo et al., 1994). This was mainly related to increased price competition
from the non-state sector, in particular, the autonomous township and village enterprises (TVEs)
which has eroded profit margins (Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, 1992). A recent study (Raiser,
1997) using enterprise level data for various ownership forms from four coastal cities shows that
the profitability decline in the SOEs is mainly related to growing competitive pressures from the
non-state sector are responsible for the erosion of profit rates in Chinese industry.
Since non-state enterprises in China-in  particular, the TVEs-have  become an increasingly
important economic sector outside state-planned production, much attention has been given to
comparisons of performance between the state  and non-state sectors. Most of these studies
focused on total factor productivity (TFP) growth to examine if enterprise reforms have initiated
efficiency improvement in  SOEs. Existing comparative work include Jefferson, Rawski and
Zheng (1989,  1992,  1994,  1996) and  Wu  (1993,  1995,  1996). These  studies  reveal  that
productivity in  both the state and  non-state industry has risen in recent years. However, the
performance of SOEs in terms of output has been much worse than that of the non-state firms.
When studies compare TFP growth across ownership categories, the results reveal that the higher
rate of output growth in collective owned enterprises (COEs) and the TVE sector was largely due
to  the higher rate of TFP growth in the non-state sector. For example, Wu and Wu (1993)
6estimated  time-series models and examined partial and total factor productivity  for both state and
rural enterprises. While they found that the TFP growth rate in the state industrial sector was
positive, averaging about 2.5 percent, it lagged behind that in the non-state sectors, particularly
township and village enterprises which averaged about 13 percent. The main explanation for the
increase in the state sector's labor productivity in recent years is capital deepening. However,
disagreements  still exist regarding the rate of TFP growth in SOEs.
Efficiency: Empirical Analysis
We now explore what  our  data  set has  to  say about these  issues and  estimate aggregate
production functions in the  state and non-state industrial sectors using provincial data. The
provincial data  is known  to  suffer from  various  aggregation problems, and  findings using
aggregate data analysis are likely to be biased (e.g. Jefferson, 1990 for a discussion). Partly to
overcome this problem, most of existing studies turns to  enterprise-level data for firm-level
efficiency analysis. However, their data sample so far has only covered a  limited number of
industries and provinces. None of the studies look at the whole industrial level, at the sarne time
covers the entire non-state sector. The industrial sector is one of the largest components of the
economy, employing 30 percent of the (formal) labor force. In the Yearbook definition, the
industrial sector is comprised of mining, quarrying, and manufacturing as well as electricity, gas
and water.
7We have constructed a data set for 30 Chinese provinces, and for the years 1994-97.9  We have
estimated data for the non-state sector by deducting state sector figures from economy-wide
figures, assuming the economy is made up of the state and non-state sector. As constructed, the
non-state sector includes collective owned units (urban and rural), joint owned, sharing holding
and foreign funded firms. The series we focus on are the total industrial value-added, fixed
capital asset,  and  the total  number of  industrial employees in  state and  non-state sectors.
Industrial value-added and total fixed capital assets of industrial enterprises are those reported
for industrial enterprises with independent accounting systems. Limiting our analysis to those
"independent accounting units" of the industrial sector introduces some bias towards large firns,
but it still captures a lot of the action in state industry, as it accounts 95 percent of SOEs gross
industrial output. Both fixed capital asset and industrial value-added are deflated by a price index
of investment in fixed asset and ex-factory price indices of industrial outputs based on 1996
price.
Our data set illustrates well several of the features described above. The difficulties encountered
by containment in the mid-nineties are clearly apparent.  While the share of total labor and
capital received by the state sector has remained roughly the same (60+percent of each), its share
in value added has been falling (from 54 to 46 percent between 1994 and 1997). This fall in
efficiency supports the notion that labor and capital are not as productively employed in the state
9 Due to different methods of data compilation used before 1994 in the China Statistical Yearbook, we cannot obtain
consistent private sector data on  industrial value-added, fixed capital asset and industrial labor. Our analysis is
therefore limited to the past four year's data. While aggregate data is known to be of poor quality, this is perceived
by many analysts to be especially the case for the 1995 series, which we treat below with more caution.
8sector as in the non-state sector 10. Both the average capital and labor productivity are much
higher in the non-state sector  -- in 1997, nearly 100 percent and 60 percent more respectively.
Over time, the average productivity of labor stagnates in the public sector, while it rises in the
non-state sector (by about 50 percent over the four years), resulting in a greater divergence over
time.
Second, the average productivity of capital has declined in both the state and non-state sector
from 1994-97, with the fall in the state sector especially large. It is interesting to observe that in
spite of (or perhaps because of) the decline in the efficiency of capital, there has been a fast rise
in capital intensity in both the state and non-state sectors, which nearly double during the four
years." Surprisingly,  the capital to labor ratios in the two sectors is about equal.12
1' Since 1996,  an increasing number of workers called "Xiagang worker" have been made redundant while
remaining on the state firms' wage bill, typically receiving minimum  wage and some social services. By the end of
1997, some estimated about 11.5 million (some millions are from industry).  However, in China Statistics  Yearbook,
the Xiagang workers remain included in the formal labor statistics. This introduces some bias in our analysis,  but
there are no reliable state-level estimates on the actual number of Xiagang workers that we can rely on to remove
this bias at this stage.
"  Similar findings were  obtained by Enos (1984) when he examined five small rural industries: iron and steel,
chemical fertilizers, farm machinery, cement, and energy (coal and electricity).
12 This reflects mixes of small and large firms in both the public and private sectors, with the first owning millions
of small and medium size firms in addition to a few thousands towering firms, while the latter is comprised of small
TVEs and large joint-ventures. It is evident that TVEs has  attracted most of rural household saving towards its
capital formation, averaged annual rural household saving is about 40 percent.
9The data shows interesting regional patterns, especially in productivity differences between the
state and non-state sector (see charts in the Appendix). Coastal and high-income provinces tend
to have a larger non-state sector. The productivity gap-  labor and capital-between  state and
non-state sectors is larger in coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
and Shandong,  than in the inner provinces.
We also estimate "average" provincial production functions of the Cobb-Douglas type in the
state and non-state sectors, and for various years (see table 4). This allows for the computing of
the marginal efficiencies of capital and labor. The results for 1996 and 1997 13  and for the pooled
1994-1997 data show that the non-state sector has a higher marginal productivity of labor and
capital than the state sector. The gap in capital performance has always been large - in the order
of two. The gap on the labor side has been small in the past, but has risen a  lot recently,
indicating perhaps the difficulty that the private sector is encountering in finding skilled labor.
With the available information, it is possible to compare roughly marginal productivity and the
value of compensation, in the two sectors. Comparing tables 2 and 4, it is apparent that workers
are overpaid in the state sector, and perhaps underpaid in the non-state sector (compared to their
marginal productivity). Based on 1997 data, wage and non-wage income per state worker is 53
'3 We excluded 1995 estimates due to poor quality of data that complied by China Yearbook. Here we only report
1996 and 1997 estimates,  the previous years of labor productivity performance  have been estimated in other studies
that are not reported here.
10percent higher than its  marginal productivity; for non-state worker, marginal productivity is
about 44 percent higher than wage'4.
In sum, our data set points clearly a picture of stagnating labor efficiency, but with a fast rise in
its compensation.  In contrast, labor productivity  has risen fast in the non-state sector, and so have
wages, although they seem to have somewhat lagged behind. On the face of it, there is a rising
misallocation of resources, and a movement of labor from the public, and to the private sector
would increase total output. We now look at this issue more carefully.
-II. Gains from Enterprise Restructuring
According to  economic principles, the  allocation of  factors from  low return to  high-return
activities can improve productivity and raise total output and national income.  This is the reason
that the objective of economic reform is to create the conditions, which motivate enterprises to
improve overall efficiency and permit  the owners of  individual factors to  seek the highest
returns. The transfer of workers to  the non-state sector produces social gains resulting from
increased productivity levels of transferred workers. This is due not  only to the migration of
high-skilled workers to the non-state sector but also to the fact that workers of any given skill
level exert more effort in their new jobs in the non-state sector than they did previously when
working in the state sector. In evaluating social efficiency of public sector downsizing, Rama
argued that  economic return, result  from a  better  allocation of labor across  sectors. When
14  Other evidence  suggests that wage equalization is likely  to hold for high skill labor, suggesting  that there is wage
compression  in the state sector with implicit subsidies  to low-skill  workers.
11contribution of displaced workers to aggregate welfare is higher out of public sector than in it,
downsizing has positive economic returns.
On pure efficiency grounds, the optimal allocation of labor in the economy occurs when the
marginal productivity is equalized. Using the estimated production functions, we can solve for
the needed transfers of labor and capital that achieves this equality. The results are shown in
Table 5.
Our 1996 results show that within the industry, 43 percent of labor (and 70 percent of capital)
needs to be transferred to the non-state sector to ensure efficient resource allocation and overall
higher productivity growth. 15 The 1997 results suggest that even larger amounts of labor and
capital need to be transferred to the non-state sector (57 percent and 74 percent of state industrial
labor and  fixed capital asset). The estimates for labor are consistent with Chinese officials'
assessment of the extent of surplus labor in SOEs at between one third and one half of the work
force (See Fan, O'Cornor and Lunati, 1998).
The estimated gains in GDP are large. A 43 percent transfer of labor to the non-state sector will
produce a gain of 2.56 percent of 1996 GDP, and a 70 percent of capital transfer will produce a
gain of  8.29 percent of  1996 GDP. This of  course assumes full employment of redundant
workers, if we consider that laid-off workers remain unemployed for a while, or not simply not
re-employable in non-state sector, and are retired early, the total social gain could be smaller.  If
15 Note that 43 percent of industrial SOE workers represent 21 percent of total SOEs workers and 11 percent of
urban workers.
12we transfer both capital and labor together, the total gain will reach 17.4 percent of 1996 GDP.
This gains are available year after year, and thus, there present value is many-folds larger. These
represent major sectoral shifts: 43 percent of labor movement,  out of SOEs would result in a 15
percent decline of output in the state sector and 33 percent of increase in output increase in the
non-state sector (see Table 5).
But  when  considering  laying  off  unproductive workers  from  the  state-sector, three  other
considerations-which  we do not measure in our simply static analysis, should also be kept in
mind: the social, financial and economic dimensions. They are likely to be related.
*  Laid-off workers do not necessarily join  the private sector immediately. From a political
economy perspective, a rapid release of large numbers of workers into the labor force would
produce "search"  unemployment and may trigger political backlash and  social upheaval,
which would scare away capital and weaken the benefits of reforms.
*  On the other hand, releasing labor also reduces the losses of SOEs, improves the condition of
banks, and makes more capital available to fuel the growth of the more efficient private
sector. By the same token, the continuation of the present situation weakens the financial
system, indeed, threatens its stability, and taxes the growth potential of the country.
*  Large layoff is likely to lead in the short term to a reduction in aggregate demand. Fear of
being layoff has  eroded consumer confidence in  spending, and this  in turn  will reduce
profitability and investment in the short term.
13How do the social and financial considerations affect the optimal redeployment decision? It is
useful to consider first a central case where the government compensates workers completely for
their losses (from Diwan, 1995).  Assume a simple one period world where workers move at zero
cost between the sectors. Denoted by p, the wage of workers in the public sector, let g (L,..)
represent the production function, and denoted by g, the marginal productivity of labor (we
assume that g'>p, that is, that the PE over-utilizes labor and makes losses on this  account).
Denoted by m, the wage in the private sector, (which is assumed to equal marginal productivity
of labor in this competitive sector). We must have p>m, since otherwise, the SOE's  workers
would have moved to the private sector. In this simple set up, the governments firing decision
depends on a comparison between costs and benefits. For each exiting worker, the PE gains [g'-
p] at the margin. This must be compared with the cost of compensation. Full compensation, in
the absence of adjustment cost, is given by [p-m]. The SOE should therefore keep firing workers
until [g'-p]=[p-m], that is, until g'=m. This is the rule used in our simulations above. Under our
base assumptions, the rule both maximizes welfare and minimizes the SOEs' deficits (and thus,
the bank losses, and the state's implicit liabilities).
Consider now departures from these assumptions. First, let us focus on the social dimension. It is
likely that there are costs of transition from job  to job. Full compensation would then be more
expensive, and less than full layoffs would be optimal if full compensation had to be paid (i.e,
less than it takes to equalize the marginal productivity of labor among the two sectors). In the
14same vein, if fast layoff increases by itself the size of the job-to-job transition costs, then the
optimal speed of layoff would be reduced further. 
16
Indeed,  there is ample evidence that the labor market is already weakening considerably.  The pace
of restructuring  has intensified since the CCP's Fifteenth Congress in 1997. Large unproductive
firms are encouraged to convert to joint stock or limited liability companies. Small- and medium
sized SOEs  have  been  restructured through  annexation, shareholding, bankruptcy, business
closedown, leasing, auction and private sales. As a result, there were 11.5 million state workers
made redundant  by 1997, and three million  were laid off during the restructuring  process in 1998.  A
recent study shows that the non-state sector is absorbing many of those laid-offs. Within a year,
more than half of the laid-off worker found new jobs, with sixty percent of those joining the
private sector either by setting up their own company or working for private companies (See
China Business Review, Oct. 1998). However, it appears that unemployment has risen sharply,
the official unemployment rate has risen to over 7 percent, but the real rate is probably much
more.
Second, we need to look at financial complications relative to the simple model. Note that the
compensation that needs to be offered is of a stock (or promisary) nature, while the benefit is a
flow. This has no bearing on the analysis as long as the public sector is not credit constraint,
since the layoff decision creates value overall, even if it is initially unfavorable from a cash flow
perspective. In the current situation of a weak and over-indebted  banking sector however, overall
16 Aghion  and Blanchard  (1994)  argue  that hasty restructuring  in the state sector,  due to the resulting  high
unemployment  which  generates  congestion  costs  and  increased  search  costs  for  new  jobs.
15credit is however limited by creditworthiness considerations. In such a world, the payment of
compensations to  fired workers would in the short-term crowd out private investment. These
constraints directly reduce the optimal speed of layoff in a manner that makes the cash flow
smoother (i.e, fire and pay compensation at the speed at which the efficiency gains from previous
retrenchment are realized). But they also put pressure on the government to optimally reduce the
scope of compensations in order to allow sufficient credit to flow to the private sector, thereby
improving labor demand, and reducing the need for high levels of compensation.
Using our estimates of marginal productivity of labor and its cost, the 1996 data shows that
SOEs incurring annual losses from keeping unproductive worker is about 3053 Yuan per worker
per year. As the result of labor transfers, the total gain from 43 percent of SOE industrial workers
migrating to the non-state sector will save SOE the equivalent of 0.8 percent of 1996 GDP. But
how much would it cost in compensation?
Table Al in the Appendix summarizes major labor redeployment programs, which have been run
in various cities and provinces, and the attached average compensation cost per worker. These
costs include unemployment insurance, early retirement, a basic living allowance subsidy, and a
one-time lump sum payment.  Some programs have  also offered active labor redeployment
components such as training and retraining, subsidy to individual business, tax break and subsidy
to employer of hiring redundant workers. On average, compensation cost ranges from 2,000 to
10,000 Yuan per worker per year and varies from city to city 17. Using a central figure of 3600
" Most of workers redundant or laid-off do not receive severance payment from Chinese firms, instead, minimum
living allowance  has be provided by government on the monthly basis.
16per  year  attached  to  the  compensation  scheme  which  is  widely  used  by  the  Chinese
government-that  is, minimum income support'8t of approximately 250 Yuan plus 50 Yuan for
medical expenses per month per worker, and considering to illustrate an average unemployment
spell of one year, the program would cost 0.96% of 1996 GDP for 43% of SOE industrial labor
transfer (about 22.49 million workers' 9). This one short cost is close to the benefits of reform that
would accrue year after year. It thus seems as a very good deal from a pure  financial/fiscal
perspective, both  on  cash  flow (small loss in  year  1, pure  gains after),  and from  a  stock
perspective (net present value gains in the order of 10 percent of GDP).
But how does it compare to the likely losses born by labor? The 1997 figures that are available to
us show that private sector wage income is 9092 Yuan per worker, versus 9128 Yuan per worker
in state sector. Since these are about equal, the main loss experienced by workers is the drop in
their income during their search for a  new job,  which is large given the ongoing levels of
compensation if job  search lasts long. The minimum support for example is about a third of
average wages only. In addition, while housing is almost always provided for SOE employees, it
is  far from clear that laid-off workers would continue to be  able to use the same facilities,
is The national "minimum  living income"  was set at 164 Yuan in 1996, 155 Yuan in 1995,  and 136 Yuan in 1994
and 114 Yuan in 1993. However, layoff allowances are set in different regions. For example, allowance in Beijing is
260 yuan every month, relatively high, the National average standard is 200 Yuan in 1993. A national survey in
1998 shows that 93.2% of the Xiagang workers have received the monthly allowance, ranging from 140 yuan to
380 yuan in different cities.
'9 The department  of Labor predicted that form 1995 to 2000, the number of laid off worker will reach 18 million.
17especially if they have to  move in  search of a job.  This would increase the loss of laid-off
workers significantly. 20
This suggests that the state should be more generous on the compensation side, especially if it is
keen on laying-off so many workers so fast 21. Since this is unlikely to be feasible financially, the
considerations above suggest that labor retrenchment should be slowed down, and that other
means to  economize on financial resources in the meantime should found. Our simulations
suggest that large gains can be harvested by also transferring capital from the least efficient SOE
to the non-state sector. Indeed, the gap in capital productivity between state and non-state is
larger than the gap in labor productivity and the predicted output gain from capital transfers are
much larger than that from labor transfer. As indicated in Table 5, we find that in 1996, it would
have been optimal to transfer 70 percent of capital to the private sector, and that this would have
resulted in a huge gain 8.3 percent of GDP per year!
20 It seems  that given  the compression  of wages  in the public  sector,  skilled  workers  tend to be less  overpaid  in the
public sector, and they tend to migrate voluntarily. This labor migration from the state sector to non-state sector has
been overwhelming  in recent years, especially as the demand for skilled workers in the private sector has taken off.
This migration is unofficially called "the dive into the ocean" (xia hai) and usually in a family the more productive
young and male  "dive" while the rest  stay in the  state sector (mimicking the  official line of  "one family, two
systems). Recent estimates are  that over 20%  of China's  public sector labor force have already moved to the
"ocean". Unfortunately, there has  been no  systematic and  economy-wide empirical studies in this  regard (See
Gordon and Li, 1997)
21 Chinese economy  at present has already shown the negative macroeconomic  effect of declining in private
spending and aggregate demand due to the low wage rate of civil workers and insufficient minimum  level of income
support  to redundant  workers.
18However, contrary to the focus on labor retrenchment, no such movement has been observed to
date on the capital front (rethorics aside). The figures in Table 3 indicate that over 65 percent of
capital formnation  took place in the public sector during the  1994-97 period. Banking sources
indicate that SOEs have consumed between 70 and 80 percent of China's savings over the recent
years, or about 20 percent of GDP. 22
What are the possible explanations  for the lack of action of the financial front, and the current zeal
on the labor front? There are two possible explanations:  banks' incentives,  and SOE's incentives.
During financial distress, banks often prefer to undertake defensive lending - lending enough to
keep the firm afloat and waiting for better times - rather than face the reality of corporate defaults.
These incentives are exacerbated by their inability to collect a part of their loans during corporate
workouts,  especially because of the broad nature of the claims that workers hold on the SOE that
employs them (social benefits, pension, ect..). Second, SOEs are likely hold strong bargaining
powers  when negotiating  with the center, especially  when they have control large pools of labor.
But clearly, the reallocation of capital towards the more efficient non-state sector has to  be
brought  into  the  discussion.  Table  6  shows  how  combinations  of  labor  and  financial
retrenchment are complementary and can bring larger gains at lesser social cost. For example,
moving 10 percent of the labor and capital from state to non-state brings more efficiency gains
22  But according to Fan (1998) state and commercial  banks have become increasingly unwilling  to provide credit to
unprofitable  SOEs preferring instead to lend to the private sector. He estimates that in 1998, 42 percent of state bank
lending  went to private sector.
19(2.8 percent of GDP per year) than the retrenchment of 43 percent of the public sector labor
force. This of course makes eminent sense: a focus on labor only would increase capital labor
ratios in SOEs, and reduce the efficiency of capital. At the very least, the government should try
to keep the capital labor ratio constant by re-deploying in parallel as much capital as labor. This
would both improve efficiency, and by slowing down the layoff period, minimize social unrest.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Chinese policy-makers face a stark dilemma: the fast closure of a large number of SOEs would
lead to high open unemployment, at least in the short run, and lead to social unrest that would
scare away private investment; but writing-off loans to bankrupt enterprises in order to bail them
out would undermine the fragile banking system, and that too would scare away new investors.
Caught between the rock and a hard place, the Chinese government will have to figure out a
middle ground and structure a path of retrenchment cum compensation to layoff workers that is
both credible and financially viable.
To be more specific, the speed of layoff should consider social and financial dimensions. If
social adjustment cost is high, likely layoff cost would be high; thus, the optimal speed of layoff
should be slow. In particular, large-scale layoff is difficult in a country that lack of social safety
nets  and social security market. Cross- country experiences, especially those in Eastern and
Central Asian have shown that countries that do not have labor market and social insurance
programs in place, labor recovers more slowly from enterprise restructuring and encounter much
more labor difficulties than countries that do. Furthermore, a generous compensation to fired
20workers in  the  short term  would crowd  out private  investment, it  has potential to  reduce
sufficient credit flow to private sector.  Thus, private sector job creation through small business
development  needs to be encouraged to put less pressure on labor transfer.
This  paper's  contribution is  to  explore what  such  a  path  may look  like,  using  estimated
production functions for the state and non state industrial sectors to  simulate the productive
effects of moving labor and capital from the less efficient state sector to the more efficient
private  sector. Clearly, we  do  not  take the  specific results  we  get too  seriously since the
production functions we estimate aggregate indiscriminately a variety of firms small and large,
and with very different problems. However, we trust that the order of magnitude we get are
robust and  thus,  symptomatic of  the  existing  Chinese economic structure.  This  sense  is
reinforced by two factors: that the data set we use exhibits many characteristics that have been
documented by other sources, such as the decline in the efficiency of SOEs and the rise in the
importance and efficiency on non-state firms; and that results are roughly robust to the choice of
estimation  year.
Our paper measures labor and capital productivity in both state and non-state industrial sector
through estimating aggregate production function using 30 provincial pooled data from 1994 to
1997. Low labor and  capital productivity, stagnated labor productivity and overpayment are
found to be prevailing in state sector over time. Our three-year separate and averaged estimation
all show a  sizable gain from labor retrenchment. In particular, our  1996 simulation results
estimate that 43 percent of labor (or some 23 million state-owned enterprise workers) and 70
percent of capital are redundant. An estimated benefit of 43 percent of labor transfer alone will
21produce a  gain  of  3.36  percent,  while costing  of  0.96  percent  of  GDP  (one time  layoff
compensation).  Labor downsizing has a positive economic rate of return.
What do our results mean for the recently announced plans to accelerate the layoff of up to 30
million workers from the state sector in the next few years. Our estimates corroborate the order
of magnitude of labor redundancy. But somewhat surprisingly, we also find that by itself, a
transfer of labor from the public to the private sector of this magnitude would only secure
relatively small gains in output, of the order of 2 percent a year. This is of course far from
insignificant,  but neither is the task of moving around 20 percent of the labor force!
We also found that much larger gains can be achieved if the SOE reform movement focuses at
the same time on the financial aspect of the problem. In particular, a transfer of 10 percent of
labor and capital achieves a greater efficiency gain than the transfer of the full 43 percent of
redundant workers from the public to the private sector. This important result is due to  two
factors: first, that capital is much more efficiently used in the non-state sector, with the efficiency
gap larger than in the case of labor. And second, that the non-state sector will need to have
access to more capital in order to employ the workers that are being laid off by the private sector.
More important, efficiency capital allocation would reduce the pressure on labor and bring larger
gains at a lower social cost.
How can a more balanced approach be  achieved? Progress can be  made on both flows and
stocks. On flows, the challenge is to reduce the net flow of finance to SOEs in ways that can
discriminate between good and bad  ones. This would have to  involve rapid progress in the
setting up of capacity in the banking supervision institutions. In addition, rules will have to be
22changed to reduce the incentives of banks to lend to bad firms, with the aim to simplify the
workout exercises and the distribution of the assets of bankrupt firms to its stakeholders. A
crucial component of this is the separation of the welfare from the business aspect of firms, in
particular, the setting of an independent social security system so that this task can be separated
from the SOEs. This will enable the government to better provide strong incentives for the SOEs,
including the option of outright privatization. But a focus on flow wills unlikely is sufficient, and
the privatization process will also have to be accelerated. This too will require rapid progress on
disentangling  the welfare and business functions of SOEs.
23Table  1:  Share  of Gross  Industrial  Output Value  by Ownership
(100 million,  calculated  at  Current  price)
State sector  Non-state Sector
SOEs  Collective owned  Other oner7shiph
1962  87.8%  12.2%  0.0%
1980  76.0%  23.5%  0.5%
1985  64.9%  32.1%  3.1%
1990  54.6%  35.6%  9.8%
1995  34.0%  36.6%  29.4%
1996  28.5%  39.4%  32.1%
1997  25.5%  38.1%  36.4%
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook
"b" other ownership include joint ventures, solely foreign-owned firms, shareholding firms and
private companies.
24Table 2: A Comparison of Base Wage and Welfare Benefit (Non-Wage) Per Worker by Ownership
(unit = Yuan  at  current  Price)
Wage income  Welfare benefits
SOEs  Collective  Other private  SOEs  Collective  Other private
1997  6747  4512  8789  2335  1166  339
1996  6280  4320  8261  2042  1053  337
1995  5625  3931  7463  1758  935  293
1994  4797  3245  6303  1468  755  275
1992  2284  1681  2987  1006  549  133
Notes: Welfare benefits do not include housing benefits in the above statistics. We expect that state
workers' benefits could be  even higher if housing benefits were added. The share of total benefit per
worker will increase  to 60-70 percent of total income per worker.
25Table 3 Basic Industrial  Information
(at constant  price, 1996=100)
1994  1995  1996  1997
State  Value added  9.34E+1  1  8.55E+1  1  8.74E+1  1  9.09E+1  1
Fixed capital asset  2.08E+12  2.64E+12  2.83E+12  3.04E+12
Labor  43710000  43970000  42774000  39459000
Share of capital  66.6%  66.1%  65.4%  63.4%
Share of labor  66.4%  66.5%  66.3%  64.7%
Share of value-added  53.8%  53.8%  48.5%  46.2%
K/L ratio  47546.37  60109.52  66227.38  76929.88
Output/K  0.42  0.28  0.27
OutputVL  20663  19834  22455
Non-state  Value added  8.04E+111  7.35E+11  9.28E+11  1.06E+12
Fixed capital asset  1.04E+12  1.36E+12  1.5E+12  1.75E+12
Labor  22110000  22130000  21726000  21534000
Share of capital  33.4%  33.9%  34.6%  36.6%
Share of labor  33.6%  33.5%  33.7%  35.3%
Share of value-added  46.2%  46.2%  51.5%  53.8%
K/L ratio  47137.51  61237.77  68919.77  81318.07
OutputVK  0.79  0.61  0.58
Output/L  27017  33354  39017
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
26Table 4: Production  Function Estimation
(at constant price, 1996=100)
Year  Sector  logA  Output  T stat.  Output  t stat.  R Z  MPL"  MPK'
elasticity  elasticity
To labor  to capital
1996  State  0.19  0.30  1.75  0.78  4.07  0.95  5917.8  0.22
Non-  1.85  0.41  3.78  0.68  7.12  0.97  13508.4  0.41
state
1997  State  -0.95  0.21  1.40  0.87  5.00  0.94  4759.8  0.24
Non-  1.72  0.40  3.21  0.69  6.21  0.96  15438.3  0.4
state
Common Effect  State  0.433  0.247  2.65  0.8345  8.02  0.94  5175.9  0.27
1994-97 (exl.
1995)
Non-  1.631  0.352  5.36  0.722  12.56  0.97  11470.8  0.47
state
Notes:  A  indicates estimated figures.
27Table 5
Output  gains/losses after labor and capital transfer  from state to non-state sector
(as share of GDP)
1996  estimation
as a result  of  labor  transfer  as  a result  of capital  transfer
(43%  of labor  transfer)  (70%  of capital  transfer)
Share  of  total loss  (-)/share  of total  gain(+)
State  -15%  -61%
Non-state  33%  118%
Net  gain  2.56%  8.29%
1997  estimation
as a result  of labor  transfer  as a result  of capital  transfer
(57%  of labor  transfer)  (74%  of capital  transfer)
Share  of total  loss  (-)/share  of  total  gain(+)
State  -16%  -69%
Non-state  38%  114%
Net  gain  3.42%  7.74%
1994-1997  estimation
as a result  of  labor  transfer  as a result  of capital  transfer
(12%  of  labor  transfer)  (70%  of  capital  transfer)
share  of total  loss  (-)/share  of  total  gain(+)
State  -6%  -48%
Non-state  11%  117%
Net gain  1%  10%
28Table  6:  Simulation  of total  output  gain  as  result  of K and  L transferred  to non-state  sector
(as  share  of 1996 GDP based  on  1996 simulation)
Total  Labor
Output  L,=0%  L,=5%  L,=1  0%  L.=20%  LI=30%  L,=35%  L,=40%  Lt=43%  L=98%
gain
Capital
K,=0%  . 2.6%
K,=5%  14%  4.C%
K,=10%  28%  5.3%
K =20%  5.8%  7.8'A
K,=30%  8 -t  10 0%
K,=35%  S02%  11.3%
K,=40%  11.8e%  12.1%
K!=45%  13.  1%
K;=50%  1  4.0%'f
Kj=60%  15.8%
Kt=70% 8.0%  9.6%  10.9%  13,i%  150%  160%  1689%  17.4%
KI=ee8%3APPENDIX
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32Table Al. A Summary  of Major  Labor Redeployment Program  in China
Type of Program  Key Features of Program  Average  Average cost  Program coverage  Financing
length  per  worker  I
of program  per year (Yuan)
1. Passive Labor  Program
Unemployment  insurance  Eligibility: cover living  expenses,  12-24  3,000-6,000  national level  2% of total company wage
Fund  health insurance and training  months
1% of worker's wage
local govemment subsidies
interest payment on Ul fund
Early retirement  50-75% of base wage  4,080  national level  govemment
5 Yrs from retirement age
Basic Living allowance  250 Yuan/month  3 month - 3,000  national level  company and govemment
Subsidy  plus 50 yuan medical expenses  2yrs
One time lump-sum payment  na  one time  na
(severance payment)
2. Active Labor  program
Training without reemployment  Dependent on length  2,000  na  company
Training &  Including cost-living support  3-12 months  6,000  Beijing Textile  30% from enterprise
Reemployment  program  Job training and job introduction  Trust Center  40% from Municipal Labor
Bureau
30% from Municipal Finance
Bureau
Subsidy to employment  of  Labor service company receive a  one time  4,000-6,000  Shanghai  govemment, society
Redundant  workers  lump-sum payment for hiring  Reemployment
Redundant workers up to 2 yrs.  Service Center  and share holding companies
Cash payment to self-  help to set up individual business  one time  10,000  Some cities
Employment
Tax break to company  if firm hires more than 60% of  na  na  Shanghai and Beijing  Municipal Labor Bureau
(a lump sum payment)  redundant workers, is eligible for
a tax break for 3 years and 50%
for next 2 years.
Notes:  1) main  categories  of  redundant  workers:  redundant  leaving  post  and  earlier  retirement.  Redundant  or  laid-off
workers:  defined  as  "people  temporarily  on  leave  from  their  work-places  due  to  a  deteriorating  situation  in  their
enterprise  but  still  maintaining  employment  situation  with  enterprises  and  receiving  layoff  allowances."  Exactly  how
many  there  are  of these  laid  off  workers  is  still  unknown  because  of  different  results  obtained  from  different  sources.
2)  Various  program  cost  above  is  based  on  one  year  cost.Estimated  Model
In order to estimate marginal productivity of factors for state and non-state, we employ the following
simple across-section equation of traditional Cobb-Douglas  translog production function. Capital and labor
are used as inputs in our model.
Q=  f (Ki, Li); Qi=  Ai Ki  Li b=  >Ln Qi = LnAi + a Ln Ki + b Ln Li  (1)
Where Qi represents value added of industrial output in nominal terms in province i  (i=l,...n) and Ki
represents the amount of fixed capital stock, and Li represents a physical count of the number of workers.
(More details on concept of capital)
1. Estimating optimal amount of labor and capital redundancy  in state sector
The Equation (2) and (3) are derived from the Equation (1) by equalizing  marginal productivity  of
labor and capital between state and non-state sector.
MPLS=MPLp  =  O  L  A  i(-as)  kas) =A-  (1-ap) kia(P)  (2)
MPK,=MPKp =  -Q  As'K  Ai,saskia(s)-l  = A1 ,PaPk.a(P)-l  (3)
K,*
Where, ki=( L *  )
Where  Qi represents  value  added of industrial  output  in nominal  terms  in province  i  (i=l,...n)
and  Ki represents  the  amount  of  fixed  capital  stock,  and  Li represents  a  physical  count  of the
number of workers in province  i  (i=1 ,...n). s stands for state sector, p stands for non-state sector.
342.  Estimates output change in both state and non-state sector after  factors  (labor and capital)
transfer
1.  State sector
Original output level before factors transfer is:
Qs, (0%)  = AO  Koa Lob
New output level after factors transfer is:
Qs, (x%)  Al K,a  L,b
Where,  K1 = Ko - Kx%  LI = Lo  -- Lx% If only transfer labor, L, and keeping  capital unmoved,  then
K-% =  0, and K 1 = Ko. Similarly, if only transfer capital stock, K, and keeping labor unmoved,
then Lx%.  =  0, and L, = Lo. X% represents the anmount  of factor transfer from state sector to non-
state sector. 0% represents no factor transfer.
Then, the changes of output in state sector after factors transfer is:
AQ,/Qs  =( Qs (x%)-Q,  (0%)  )/Qs =( Al K1a  Lb  - Ao Koa Lob) / Ao  Koa Lob  (4)
2. Non-state sector
Original output level before factors transfer is:
a  b
QP (0o/%)  = Ao Ko  L0
New output level after factors transfer is set to be:
Qp  (x%)=Al  Kla  LIb
Where,  K 1 = Ko + Kx%, LI = Lo  + Lx% If only transfer  labor, L, and keeping  capital unmoved,  then
K  -%  = 0, and K 1 = Ko.  Similarly, if only transfer capital stock, K, and keeping labor unmoved,
then Lx%.  =  0, and LI = Lo.
35The gain of output in state sector after factors transfer is:
AQp/Qp  =( Qp (x%/.)  Qp  (o%)  )/Qp  =( A1 Kla Llb -Ao Koa Lob) / A 0 Koa Lob  (5)
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